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Abstract
In this paper we show how trading rules can generate excess volatility in
the exchange rate through repeated entry and exit of currency ￿bears￿ and
￿bulls￿ . This is something of a caricature: but it allows us to show that o¢ cial
action can have self-ful￿lling e⁄ects as market composition shifts in ways that
support o¢ cial stabilization. Intervention if and when the rate moves outside
what Williamson has labelled ￿ monitoring bands￿can reduce market volatility as
the e⁄ect of the policy is to select endogenously traders from the market whose
expectations match o¢ cial intervention.
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11 Introduction
When the euro was created in 1999 some economists1 predicted that it would rise
strongly from its launch value of $1.18 as it challenged the dollar￿ s position as the
world￿ s key reserve currency. Perhaps because Asian countries lost faith in the IMF
and turned to the dollar as a substitute, the euro bulls were disappointed; and the
new currency steadily lost value, Figure 1. Finally, when the euro fell to 83 cents
in September 2000, coordinated Central Bank intervention was implemented to stop
the slide. A famously incautious remark by the then head of ECB2 led to further
weakness (with the euro falling to its historic minimum a month later); but the euro
stabilized around 90 cents. From early 2002, the currency experienced a reversal that
was to take it well above the launch price, reaching a peak of $1.36 in the end of
2004. Currently, with the euro standing close to $1.30, there is still talk of further
dollar devaluation to help reduce the US de￿cit.
Figure 1: The value of the Euro since its launch in Jan 1999. Source: ECB
The substantial - and surprising - gyrations in the euro/dollar rate have led to calls
for the publication of sustainable or ￿ equilibrium exchange rates￿ . John Williamson
for example has suggested that this would be an appropriate initiative for the IMF
1Portes and Rey (1998) for example.
2When asked whether a slump in currencies caused by a war in the Middle East might lead central
banks to intervene in the markets, Mr Duisneberg said, ￿I wouldn￿ t think so￿ .
2which, as part of its new medium term strategy, aims to involve itself more closely
with the a⁄airs of G8 countries. It has been o¢ cially argued, however, that any such
steps would be unattractive ￿even embarrassing ￿for the ECB and the Fed, neither
of which have the exchange rate as a policy target. Both players reserve the right to
intervene at values which they may judge to be inappropriate: but, save for such ad
hoc intervention, things should be left to market forces.
In ￿nancial markets where portfolio management is delegated to agents with pri-
vate information, traders will be subject to monitoring rules. Since trades involve
signalling the quality of the trader as well as the asset, Dasgupta and Prat (2005,
2006) have shown that even traders who are being optimally monitored will fail to
push prices to equilibrium; and, though they begin trading sincerely, they will even-
tually ￿ follow the herd￿ . With ad hoc monitoring rules, the risk of market ine¢ ciency
is much greater, as Grossman and Zhou (1993) showed for ￿ drawdown rules￿(that
involve ￿ring traders who lose more than a given percent of previous peak value for
the portfolio).
In this short paper, there are two types of trader ￿bulls and bears ￿subject to
ad hoc monitoring rules, and there is excess volatility as monitoring rules lead to the
￿ churning￿of traders. This is something of a caricature: but it allows us to show how
o¢ cial action can have self-ful￿lling e⁄ects if market composition shifts in ways that
support o¢ cial stabilization.3 The action we discuss is more than merely announcing
equilibrium rates, however: it involves stabilizing intervention if and when the rate
moves outside what Williamson has labelled ￿ monitoring bands￿ .
The paper proceeds by ￿rst indicating how the entry and exit of bulls and bears
adds to the volatility of an exchange rate driven by random walk fundamentals. In
section two, in addition, it is shown how the ￿churning￿of traders can generate excess
volatility. Can this ex-ante excess volatility - induced by trading strategies and noisy
fundamentals - be reduced by implementing a monitoring band? We argue that it can
when the monitoring band interacts with the monitoring rules in the market; so the
e⁄ect of the policy is to a⁄ect the endogenous selection of traders whose expectations
match o¢ cial intervention. The paper concludes that current policy may be missing
a free lunch - and speculates on why reform may not be incentive compatible.
1.1 One-Time Switching of ￿bear￿and ￿bull￿traders in the market
Let exchange market traders be of two types, ￿bears￿who are pessimistic about the
trend-value of domestic currency and ￿bulls￿who are optimistic. It is assumed that
switches between employing one or the other types of trades are driven by public
signals: when losses from some previous market peak hit the limit set by a ￿draw-
down law￿for example, as in Grossman and Zhou (1993). If draw-down rules are the
3See Krugman and Miller (1992) for a similar argument in connexion with target zones.
3same across the market then the market as a whole will switch at once, so traders at
any point of time will be homogenous ￿which is what we assume.
Before characterizing the behavior of exchange rates when all traders are of one
type or the other, we must point out that our algebraic treatment follows standard
practices in measuring the exchange rate as the domestic currency price of foreign
currency. So, in Europe for example, s will represent the (log) price of a dollar in
euros.4
In this notation domestic currency bears will add an appreciation premium to the
mathematical expectations of exchange rate change, despite fundamentals following
random walk, so :
EPds=dt = Eds=dt + ￿; (1)
where EP indicates bears￿expectations, E the rational expectations and ￿ the ap-
preciation premium. Similarly, the change in the exchange rate expected by bulls
will lie below its mathematical expectation change by a term that represents their
bullishness for domestic currency, which for convenience we also assume to be ￿:5
EOds=dt = Eds=dt ￿ ￿:






P(x) + ￿ =
1
￿
(sP(x) ￿ x); (2)
where subscript P represents bears. With no-bubble-condition, (2) has the solution:
sP(x) = x + ￿￿: (3)
So with bears permanently in the market, exchange rates have a misalignment of
￿￿. (Likewise, the exchange rates with bulls permanently in the market are given by
sO(x) = x ￿ ￿￿, where subscript O indicates bulls).
Figure 2 illustrates how the presence of bears and bulls a⁄ects exchange rates.
Using the horizontal axis to represent fundamentals and vertical the exchange rate,
the 45-degree line FF represents the fundamental value for exchange rates (when
￿ = 0). The two other parallel lines PP and OO indicate respectively when local
currency bears or bulls are in the market. To see why PP lies above the 45￿ degree
line, for example, note that ￿in this two currency context ￿a euro pessimist is a
dollar optimist: so the presence euro pessimists will drive the dollar to a premium.
(Conversely, for OO, the presence of euro optimists drives the dollar to a discount).
Notice that, because there is no switching, the volatility of exchange rates is not
a⁄ected in either case.
4Note, however, Figure 1 uses the opposite convention and measures the dollar price of the Euro.












Figure 2: Exchange Rate Dynamics with One-Time Switching of Bulls and Bears
5How will switching between trader types impact on exchange rates and currency
volatility? To start with, consider the case of a one-time switch. Assume that for
high values of s only euro-pessimists will be in the market: but they will be replaced
by euro-optimists if and when the value of s falls to ￿￿ s. Symmetrically, only euro-
optimists will be in the market for low s, with a switch in market composition at
￿ s. On these assumptions, the solutions for the exchange rates (formally derived in
Appendix A) are as shown in Figure 2.
The concave curve ABH represents solution under bears when they are expected
to be driven out the market at A. The exit of bears at A is locally irreversible, so only
value matching applies. Since there will be no bulls in the market for exchange rates
above ￿ s, bears￿solution approaches PP asymptotically. (The exchange rate under
bulls is sketched symmetrically, shown by the convex curve BAL.) It is clear from the
￿gure that within the bounds of ￿￿ s and ￿ s, exchange rates exhibit hysteresis: if bears
are in the market, they will stay there until ￿￿ s is reached (vice versa for the bulls).
Finally, note that this single cycle entry and exit generates signi￿cant persistence in
exchange rate misalignment: take the bears￿solution for example, as long as x is
su¢ ciently larger than ￿ x, sP(x) ￿ x ￿ ￿￿.
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Figure 3: Exchange Rate Volatility with One-Time Switch between Bull and Bears.
6Another interesting feature of exchange rates with entry and exit is that they
exhibit excess volatility. The instantaneous volatility of the exchange rate is simply
given by the absolute value of its slope. Since the exchange rate under bears is
concave and asymptotically approaches the 45-degree line, its short run volatility
is everywhere above the fundamental solution. This is shown in Figure 3, where
volatility under bears starts at a higher level and declines asymptotically towards 1.
The reason why switching adds to volatility is easy to see. Starting at L, for example,
where the market is dominated by euro-optimists, consider an increase in the variable
x, representing fundamentals. The dollar will increase both for fundamental reasons
and also because the market anticipates that the euro-optimists will lose their jobs.
The same principle applies for repeated switching under a draw down rule, as is shown
in the next section.
1.2 Repeated Switching
Exchange rate solutions when traders are hired and ￿red under a draw-down rule
are derived formally in Appendix B. Figure 4 illustrates two solutions lying between
fundamental values of y and z, which act as triggers for ￿ring and hiring as the
vertical distance between the exchange rates L and H corresponds to the draw-down
rule of Grossman and Zhou (1993).6 Thus the concave solution labelled SR
P , shows
the outcome for the exchange rate when traders are all euro-pessimists who fear losing
their jobs at L where fundamentals have moved against the dollar in favour of the
euro. By symmetry, the solution SR
O shows how the exchange rate will behave when
trades are being conducted by euro-optimists fearing to lose their jobs at H.
Together these segments describe a range of hysteresis rather like that in the
one-time switching case shown in the previous ￿gure. The di⁄erence here is that
these linked line segments will ￿when fundamentals move su¢ ciently in the direction
predicted by current traders ￿slide between the parallel lines labelled SUI and SLI
to which they ￿ smooth paste￿as shown in the ￿gure. At H for example a positive
shock will lead to the segments sliding up along the envelope, while a negative shock
involves no sliding as the rate moves down SR
P .
The smooth pasting re￿ ects the fact that traders will not lose their jobs if the
rate moves in the direction that they have been forecasting; and the sliding re￿ ects
the shifting of the trigger for the drawdown rule as a new currency peak is realized.
The reason that the envelope lines SUI and SUI lie inside PP and OO is because
traders are never sure to keep their jobs. On SUI for instance euro pessimists are in
place, but they are not permanently in place: they will expect to lose their jobs if
fundamentals move fractionally against the dollar.
Since both SR
O and SR
P are steeper than 45￿, except at the extremities where they






Figure 4: Repeated Switching.
8smooth paste, we conclude:
Proposition 1: For repeated switching, there is excess volatility of exchanges rates
almost everywhere.
The exchange rate e⁄ects of repeated switching between bulls and bears as shown
in Figure 4 closely resembles that described in Krugman and Miller (1993, Figure
A2) where the switching is between risk averse wealth owners and risk neutral stop
lost traders subject to draw-down rules. This is not coincidence: it re￿ ects the fact
that, in the stochastic framework we are using here, risk aversion manifest itself as
a trend. This ￿observational equivalence￿means that one may be able to apply the
results we obtain here to the case where heterogeneity re￿ ects risk preferences and
not optimism of pessimism per se. We return to this point in conclusion.
2 E⁄ects of imposing a monitoring band
How might the implementation of a monitoring band along the lines advocated by
John Williamson (1998) a⁄ect the excess volatility described in the previous section?
To answer this question we assume that:
(i) the monitoring band - within which there is no intervention - lies symmetrically
around the origin with half-width ￿ s;
(ii) mean-reverting intervention occurs outside these limits. For concreteness we
assume that above ￿ s a negative trend of ￿￿dt is applied to fundamentals, and con-
versely a positive uptrend of ￿dt below ￿￿ s: but it could take the form of randomized
intervention with the same expected value;
(iii) the implementation of this intervention triggers a switch in market com-
position at ￿ s and ￿￿ s: the monitoring band is, so to say, a trigger for monitoring
rules.
If the market is populated with euro-pessimists, for example, and s rises to ￿ s
leading to o¢ cial intervention to check the rise in the dollar, this switches market
composition to euro-optimists. In the terminology of Sarno and Taylor (2001; 2002,
Ch. 7), we are e⁄ectively assuming that intervention policy acts as coordinating
device across all agents in the market. Is this what occurred in September 2000 when
an o¢ cial action was taken to stop the slide in the euro?
The formal results in Appendix C are illustrated in Figure 5, where the schedule
ABH indicates the solution when traders are euro-pessimists and BAL when trades
are being carried out by euro-optimists. Note that outside the monitoring band
there are no switches and the traders in place have beliefs that coincide with o¢ cial
policy. The linked solution segments SM
P and SM
O indicating the presence of hysteresis,
smooth paste against the top and bottom of the band respectively (between the
fundamental triggers ￿￿ x). They are therefore a good deal ￿ atter than the sliding











Figure 5: Entry and Exit of Bulls and Bears with a Monitoring Band
Proposition 2: With a credible monitoring band, the volatility of exchanges rates
is everywhere less than one.
As ABH is concave and asymptotically approaches x + 2￿￿ when x ! ￿1,
the slope of ABH is everywhere less than 1. This implies that excess volatility
for the bear￿ s solution with monitoring band is substantially reduced, indicating the
stabilizing power of the monitoring band. The same argument applies to the exchange
rate solution for bulls ABL: These short run volatilities are shown in Figure 6.
Our results involve a good deal of hysteresis. This would not be true if traders
were to be switched in the middle of the band. This is another possibility that remains
to be explored along with variations in the size of the draw-down rule.
101
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Figure 6: Exchange Rate Volatility with Entry and Exit of Bull and Bears and a
Monitoring Band
113 Conclusions
In September 2000, Central Banks successfully used coordinated intervention to sta-
bilize the euro/dollar exchange rate. We have shown how, via the endogeneity of
market composition, monitoring bands o⁄er the prospect of harnessing private sector
expectations in support of o¢ cial policy on a more regular basis. So it seems that
the laissez faire policy currently adopted by the ECB and the Fed fails to exploit a
virtuous circle of self-ful￿lling expectations. We are led to ask therefore whether the
proposed reform is incentive compatible for the major players, including the US Fed.
Note that the model used above is based on heterogeneity beliefs about currency
trends and it is virtually equivalent to the case where heterogeneity re￿ ects risk
preferences, between wealth owners and hedge funds for example. Could this inter-
pretation provide an answer to why the free lunch still lies on the table? We have
shown how churning of traders under draw-down rules generates excess volatility (and
how monitoring bands can reduce this). But it is well known that the pro￿tability
of hedge funds increases with asset price volatility. So if owners of hedge funds have
substantial in￿ uence on policy, it is di¢ cult to believe that they will be enthusiastic
supporters of regimes promising exchange rate tranquillity.
Further research using this alternative characterization of heterogeneity may be
well be worth while. Note, however, that the zero pro￿t assumption used in Krugman
and Miller (1993) would need to be modi￿ed to allow for supernormal pro￿ts by hedge
funds.
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13Appendix
A One-Time Switching
With bears in the market (i.e., s(x) ￿ ￿￿ s), the exchange rate is a solution to (2):
sP(x) = x + ￿￿ + A+ exp(￿x) + A￿ exp(￿￿x); (A.1)
where A￿ are two arbitrary constants to be determined by boundary conditions. When bulls





O(x) ￿ ￿ =
1
￿
(sO(x) ￿ x); for s ￿ ￿ s
which permits the following general solution
sO(x) = x ￿ ￿￿ + B+ exp(￿x) + B￿ exp(￿￿x): (A.2)
To determine completely the solutions for the entry and exit, we specify the following
boundary conditions. Note ￿rst that, when s > ￿ s, there are only bears in the market. So for
s ! 1, we must have the asymptotic condition
lim
x!1




sO(x) ! x ￿ ￿￿: (A.4)
Applying (A.3) and (A.4) to (A.1) and (A.2) respectively yields A+ = B￿ = 0.
Assume that entries (and exits) are anticipated, and denote the fundamental trigger for
the entry of bears (and exit of bulls) by ￿ x, then no-arbitrage implies the following value
matching condition
sP(￿ x) = sO(￿ x) = ￿ s: (A.5)
By symmetry,
sO(￿￿ x) = sP(￿￿ x) = ￿￿ s: (A.6)
Solving (A.5) and (A.6) yields the solution for bears
sP(x) = x + ￿￿ ￿
2￿￿sinh(￿￿ x)
sinh(2￿￿ x)
exp(￿￿x); x ￿ ￿￿ x; (A.7)
where sinh(￿) is a hyperbolic sine function. The solution for bulls is
sO(x) = x ￿ ￿￿ +
2￿￿sinh(￿￿ x)
sinh(2￿￿ x)
exp(￿x); x ￿ ￿ x; (A.8)
and the entry and exit trigger can be determined by
￿ x + ￿￿ ￿
2￿￿sinh(￿￿ x)
sinh(2￿￿ x)
exp(￿￿￿ x) = ￿ s: (A.9)
14B Repeated Switching
The solutions SUI and SLI will lie in the interior of the solution SU and SL (corresponding
to OO and PP in Figure 4):
SU = x + ￿￿ SL = x ￿ ￿￿ (B.10)
SUI = x + ￿￿
0
SLI = x ￿ ￿￿
0
(B.11)
where 0 < ￿
0
< ￿ and ￿
0
need to be determined.




p = x + ￿￿ + D+e￿x + D￿e￿￿x (B.12)
SR
O = x ￿ ￿￿ + A+e￿x + A￿e￿￿x
where D￿=A￿ depend on the switching point y but ￿
0
and ￿x = z ￿ y are independent
from it. Because of symmetry we only need to solve for SR
P : One condition to be imposed is
value matching at L :
SR
P (y) = SLI(y) (B.13)
Given that we assume reversible switching we need to impose value-matching and smooth
pasting at H :
SR
P (y + ￿x) = SUI(y + ￿x) (B.14)
SR
P (y + ￿x) = S
0
UI(y + ￿x) (B.15)









Since it takes 2￿ s to switching we derive ￿
0
from the following switching condition:
SUI(y + ￿x) ￿ SLI(y) = ￿x + 2￿￿
0
= 2￿ s = 2￿ s (B.17)
whereas ￿x is derived by replacing ￿
0
in (B.16) using (B.17):7
cosh(￿￿x) = 2
(2￿￿ + 2￿ s ￿ ￿x)
(2￿￿ ￿ 2￿ s + ￿x)
(B.18)
7Note that the RHS in is decreasing in (B.18) ￿x and the LHS increasing in ￿x thus
de￿ning a unique solution.
15C Monitoring Bands and Monitoring Rules
If ￿￿ x ￿ x ￿ ￿ x and bears are in the market, the exchange rate takes the same form as in
(A.1) and is rewritten as
sN
P (x) = x + ￿￿ + AN
+ exp(￿x) + AN
￿ exp(￿￿x): (C.19)







P(x) + ￿ =
1
￿
(sP(x) ￿ x); (C.20)
which permits a solution of
sI
P(x) = x + 2￿￿ + AI
+ exp(￿+x) + AI
￿ exp(￿￿x); (C.21)
where ￿￿ = (￿ ￿
p
￿2 + 2￿2=￿)=￿2, and subscripts N and I represent with and without
intervention respectively.
At ￿￿ x, value matching and smooth pasting conditions apply
sN
P (￿￿ x) = sI
P(￿￿ x) = ￿￿ s; (C.22)
dsN
P (￿￿ x)=dx = dsI
P(￿￿ x)=dx:




P(x) ! x + 2￿￿: (C.23)
By symmetry, the solution for the bulls can be constructed as
si
O(x) = ￿si
P(x); i = N;I: (C.24)
Together with the value matching conditions (A.5) and (A.6), one can solve for the unique
set of solutions for bears and bulls under the monitoring band.
Solving these boundary conditions yields a ￿xed point equation for the intervention point




(￿￿ s + ￿ x ￿ ￿￿)cosh2(￿￿ x) +
￿+
￿
(￿￿ s + ￿ x ￿ 2￿￿)sinh(￿￿ x)cosh(￿￿ x)
￿
+ ￿￿ = 0:
(C.25)









(￿￿ s + ￿ x ￿ ￿￿)cosh[￿(x + ￿ x)] + ￿+(￿￿ s + ￿ x ￿ 2￿￿)sinh[￿(x + ￿ x)]=￿
￿
;
for ￿￿ x ￿ x ￿ ￿ x
x + 2￿￿ + (￿￿ s + ￿ x ￿ 2￿￿)exp(￿+(x ￿ ￿ x)); for x < ￿￿ x:
The exchange rate solution for bulls can be constructed using (C.24).
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